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Recently, there has been a surge of interest in analyzing the market as a social 
structure. One of the major issues is whether the industrialization paths in 
various countries have become divergent or convergent. In this paper, we 
attempt to compare South Korea and the United States. Research questions 
raised are: first, what are the main characteristics of the structural change in 
the market; and second, whether the evolving Korean industrial structure is 
converging toward the structure exhibited by advanced economies such as the 
United States? Because of active interventions of the Korean government in 
industrial development, we originally expected that the Korean Industrial 
Input/Output structures would differ from those of the United States. However, 
we found that Korean I/O structures are moving towards the U.S. structure as 
the Korean economy develops. We interpreted that the convergent path may have 
resulted from technological imperatives of inter-industry relations. During the 
market’s evolutionary process, however, we found that the government 
participated in the evolution of such a market structure by selectively supporting 
key industries with its policy loans.
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INTRODUCTION
In the face of global capitalism, scholars have begun to examine how 
national institutions of production and distribution change in response 
to external changes in the international political economy. Some argue 
that competition, imitation, and diffusion due to trade and the flow of 
capital and technology have all contributed to a convergence among 
nations. Others are skeptical, insisting that different historical legacies 
and different paths of industrialization due to economic policies or 
state intervention in the market have acted to prevent the convergence 
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of economic institutions. In particular, the trajectory of the latecomers 
to industrialization (e.g., South Korea and other newly developing 
countries in the late 20th century) is very different from that of 
advanced Western industrialized nations (Biggart and Hamilton, 1992; 
Biggart, 1991). They argue that convergence fails to materialize.
This debate is closely related to the effects of globalization: is 
globalization resulting in homogenization or heterogenization? Some 
feel that globalization’s basic tendency is toward a convergence of not 
only political economy but also culture. Globalization through many 
factors ― technological and cultural exchange, and the emergence of 
transnational corporations ― accelerate the linkage of diverse markets 
into a unified global market. In particular, they emphasize the impact 
of financial integration (Dornbusch, 1998).
The role of transnational capital in the global market is particularly 
important in promoting the convergence of national markets. As Berger 
summarized, at the macro-economic level, neo-classical theory predicts 
that interest rates, profits, wages and incomes in general would begin 
to converge along with rates of growth and productivity (Berger and 
Dore, 1996: 8).
Meanwhile, in spite of the pressure for convergence resulting from 
globalization, some are keenly opposed to this interpretation, pointing 
out the limits of globalization and increasing diversity of national 
systems (Wade, 1990; Boyer, 1996). Despite increasing integration of 
financial and production markets, discrepancies still remain in foreign 
exchange policies and government intervention still influences the 
domestic sector. Variations in policy making, social classes, and 
national ideology can all be viewed as the “national context,” 
functioning to limit convergence. As Garrett insists, the effects of 
globalization are mediated by domestic policies and considerable 
diversity of national policies (Wade, 1990).1 For example, in terms of 
manufacturing methods, Japan’s emphasis on lean production, 
Germany’s on technical skill, and the U.S.’s on flexible mass 
production are all distinct approaches. This debate tends to focus, 
however, only on advanced countries. The effects of globalization are 
not limited to just those nations, and the convergence/divergence 
debate needs to include other countries, particularly the Newly 
Industrialized Countries [NIC] or nations at the periphery. Here, we 
1 See Gold (1986), and Appelbaum and Henderson (1992) as well. For differing 
views, see Landsberg (1979) and Warren (1973).
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would like to focus on a case in the NICs. Are they following the same 
steps of converging towards advanced nations with a time lag? Or do 
they have different mechanisms from industrialized nations that lead 
to divergence?
Many experts on high-speed economic growth posited the existence 
of an “Asian Model” that differed from the advanced Western nations’ 
developmental path (Gereffi and Wyman, 1990; Haggard, 1990; 
Cumings, 1987).2
In this paper, we examine the case of South Korea. South Korea 
achieved noteworthy economic growth in the past thirty years after a 
take-off stage in the 1970s and has secured a place in the 
semi-periphery of the world economic system. In spite of its financial 
crisis in 1997, South Korea recovered very rapidly and is now a 
member of the OECD.
As a newly industrializing country which has been heralded by 
some as an economic miracle, the Korean model has been highlighted 
by many theorists as well as politicians. Briefly speaking, the South 
Korean model is characterized by strong but selectively imposed state 
intervention in the market, state discipline on the chaebol (large 
conglomerates), and strong state control over labor unions similar to 
some other Asian nations but quite different from Western 
industrialized countries (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990).
However, some insist that the Korean market is growing similar to 
the market in the advanced industrialized nations despite a different 
pattern of industrialization with a time gap. Because of its trajectory, 
South Korea is often discussed in terms of social development theories 
such as modernization theory or dependency theory. Most 
examinations take a macro approach. In this paper, we have chosen to 
investigate the tendencies toward convergence or divergence, using a 
social network methodology to explore the market structure among 
industrial sectors. Based on this analysis, we also predict the future of 
industrialization in Korea.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
The convergence and divergence debate has arisen relatively recently, 
however the origins are deeply rooted in the social science of the 
2 See Gold (1986), and Appelbaum and Henderson (1992) as well. For differing 
views, see Landsberg (1979) and Warren (1973).
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1950s. Modernization theory, predominant over the last several 
decades, assumes implicitly or explicitly that the path of modernization 
is similar across nations, emphasizing that underdeveloped countries 
will follow the same modernization process of their predecessors.
Modernization theorists, instead of diversity (that is, the multiple 
directions of different countries in modernization processes), basically 
take the position that pre-modern countries will modernize through the 
diffusion of technology or institutions from core to periphery, and that 
underdeveloped countries are able to take advantage of this diffusion. 
Neo-classical theories of free markets among nations are an important 
cornerstone of this view.
All modernization perspectives do not argue for the same or similar 
tendencies in the process of modernization. Some recognize a 
multi-linear trajectory of modernization. For example, state-led 
industrialization in the modernization process of Asian countries leads 
to divergence in political economic systems. But in spite of different 
paths, the ultimate outcome may be similar for both early and late 
industrializing nations.
　Based on dependency theory, some theorists tend to emphasize the 
diversity of industrialization paths. They argue that we have witnessed 
a widening gap between the core and periphery due to the 
international division of labor. They find differences in organization, 
infrastructure, and values everywhere.
The neo-classical economic paradigm, which has a strong affinity 
with modernization theory, tends to have difficulties in explaining the 
Asian Miracle. The neo-classical model maintains that a free market 
and freedom from state intervention are necessary conditions for 
economic development. However, the rapid economic growth of Asian 
countries coupled with powerful state intervention or market 
distortions would seem to contradict this postulate.
　A number of scholars have studied the Asian Miracle not only in 
terms of institutional factors, including economic policies, but also 
cultural ones (Berger and Hsiao, 1988). It is ironic that Confucianism, 
which has been considered a barrier to economic growth, provided 
those Asian countries with a dynamic for economic development by 
emphasizing self-discipline, a this-world oriented attitude, and group 
loyalties.3 The industrialization of Asian nations must be seen as a case 
3 See Cho (1989) and Lee (1992) for a discussion of the relationship of culture to 
industrialization in South Korea.
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of “different paths but like results”. The process of industrialization 
was very different from the Western one. How, in particular, did the 
process work in South Korea, which achieved remarkable economic 
growth in the last three decades and also recovered very rapidly from 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997? 
South Korean development was state-initiated and export-led, relying 
on cheap labor and the chaebols. Various economic policies which made 
up the Korean development model adapted to changes in both 
domestic and world economic systems. In the 1960s, development was 
focused on light industry and took advantage of cheap labor. South 
Korea produced textiles or assembled electronic parts imported from 
Japan or the U.S. In the 1970s, the Korean government made the 
decision to move from light to heavy industry. Besides the growing 
domestic need for heavy industry, South Korea was also playing a role 
in the world system by taking over some of the chemical and heavy 
industry which was becoming increasingly uncompetitive in advanced 
capitalist countries because of relatively high labor intensity. This has 
been described as the “triad system” in the commodity chain.4 Simply 
put, Korea took advantage of its comparatively lower labor costs 
within the world system.5
With the restructuring of the world political economy since the 
mid-1980s, however, Korea began to lose the competitive advantage of 
labor costs which had sustained its export-led industrialization. Broadly 
speaking, the crisis of Fordism and the emergence of new modes of 
accumulation (e.g., post-Fordism, flexible accumulation, etc.) resulted in 
a reformulation of the world economy (Lash and Urry, 1987). This 
structural chain had an impact on Korea’s place in the export chain of 
the world economy as well. 
China and new Asian NICs such as Thailand and Indonesia have 
taken away the competitive advantage of low cost labor from South 
Korea. As a result, Korea entered into a new period of competition in 
the world economy. The Korean economy adjusted to a new world 
economy. The state pursued a number of restructuring policies that 
4 See Gereffi and Wyman (1990) for the concept of a commodity chain.
5 Needless to say, the Korean economic model relied on low labor costs to achieve 
rapid economic growth. In the 1970s, Korean workers’ wages were about 1/10th that of 
American workers (Deyo, 1989). The great quantity of low cost labor was crucial fuel 
for rapid economic growth during the period of state-led export-oriented 
industrialization. During this time, Korean workers mainly assembled products, using 
imported technology and capital from Japan, and exported them to the U.S. market.
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included privatization of commercial banks, deregulation or lessening 
of state intervention, and closing down some industrial sectors such as 
mining and textiles that had lost competitiveness with other countries. 
The state also shifted subsidies from labor-intensive industries to 
technology-intensive ones.
Since the 1990s, information technology related industries such as 
semi-conductors, internet-based firms, and venture firms producing 
high-value products and services have occupied leading positions. 
South Korea started to experience labor shortages due to rapidly 
increasing labor costs.
Korea’s rapid industrialization has been crucially shaped by the 
chaebols and their pursuit of “economies of agglomeration” or 
“economies of size”. Chaebols have historically pursued market share at 
the expense of profit and have in turn been rewarded by the 
government with favorable loans and policies based on their market 
rank.
To understand Korea’s banking system, it may be helpful to 
distinguish between capital market-based and credit-based systems 
(Wade, 1990). In a capital market system, securities (stocks and bonds) 
are the main source of long-term business financing. Prices are 
determined in large part through the interplay of supply and demand. 
In a credit-based system, the capital market is weak and firms depend 
heavily on credit for raising finances beyond retained earnings. Firms, 
therefore, heavily depend on whoever controls credit (Wade, 1990). 
South Korea’s banking system is predominantly credit-based, and it is 
heavily dependent on its controllers. The main controller has been the 
Korean government, which has played a pivotal role in initiating 
industrialization through tightly controlling the allocation of resources. 
The government has not only supplied big business with enormous 
capital, but also has been able to discipline big business through 
control of the banks. This kind of banking system is very different 
from a capital-based one based on market principles. According to this 
understanding, South Korea has pursued industrialization differently 
from its Western counterparts. If we take a look at both the outcome 
and stages of development, however, we can see that South Korea’s 
path of industrialization seems to approach the structure of the U.S. 
despite a time lag. It is not obvious that this gap results in diversity: 
if underdeveloped countries follow a similar path, it is just a matter of 
a time lag, and not diversity. In spite of state-led industrialization, the 
South Korean government selectively intervened in the market, and 
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might have followed the directions of a market. For example, after the 
financial crisis, not only were the chaebols reorganized, but the banking 
system was also reformed to create a more competitive market system. 
Globalization seems to have accelerated these efforts.
Briefly speaking, we may observe the phenomenon of “different 
paths, but like results” in the Korean case. The discussion below 
focuses on such a possibility of a converging path toward 
industrialization.
The emergence of neo-institutionalism in the social sciences reminds 
us of the importance of the market structure. Replacing the 
conventional concept of a universal free market with the market as a form 
of social structure, neo-institutional theorists attempt to explain different 
forms of the market in terms of social, cultural, and political processes 
(Hodgson, 1994; Swedberg, 1994; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Biggart 
and Hamilton, 1992; Biggart, 1990). They highlight path-dependent 
development patterns of the market in regional economies (Gereffi and 
Wyman, 1990).
Influenced by neo-institutional theories, but not necessarily 
neo-institutional theorists themselves, a few sociologists have attempted 
to analyze market transaction patterns, an area previously monopolized 
by economists, with the concepts and tools of social network analysis 
(Scott, 1991; Borgatti and Freeman, 19910; Burt, 1991). Unlike 
conventional neo-classical economic studies of industrial development 
that assume that market transactions among different industrial sectors 
merely reflect technological links among industries, network analysts 
tried to show explicitly the ways in which the market is structured. A 
pioneer of this approach is Ronald Burt (Burt, 1988; Burt and Carlton, 
1989). Relying on Input-Output (IO) Table data from the U.S., he 
showed that the American market was stable during the 1970s and 
1980s, and that the boundaries and market positions in the transaction 
network had effect on the profit margin of firms in the market.
Students of Burt applied similar techniques to Korean data to explain 
profit margins of firms or subcontracting relationships in different 
markets (Chang, 1999). Others used IO network transactions to analyze 
chaebol diversification strategies and to explain the survival of chaebols 
during the 1997 economic crisis (Kim, Park, and Lee, 1998). All these 
analyses focused either on the stability of markets in advanced 
economies or on structural characteristics of the market in a given 
year, neglecting the evolutionary process of market structuration. In 
this paper, we explore the evolution of market structure in a rapidly 
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developing economy (the South Korean economy). Even though we 
rely on social network analysis, we do not assume divergent market 
structures as neo-institutional theorists do. Here, market structure is 
demonstrated through the patterns of selling and buying among 
industries. The key questions are the following: 1) Is the Korean 
market as stable as the American market? 2) Is the Korean economy 
evolving toward the structure of an advanced economy? 3) What is the 
role of the government in structuring transaction markets?
NETWORK MARKET ANALYSIS
In the national economy of a society, industries are directly and 
indirectly linked with one another through processes in which 
commodities and services produced by one industry flow into other 
industries as raw materials. Network analysis of input-output tables 
(hereafter, IO tables) provides a new analytical method by which to 
examine inter-industry relationships quantitatively.
An inter-industry network is defined as the network of transactions 
of commodities and services between industries as represented by an 
IO table during a fixed period in a given national economy. 
Transforming an IO table into an adjacency matrix where cells are 
dichotomized into 0’s and 1’s has certain advantages. First, it allows us 
to depict the global market structure of direct links graphically and to 
calculate various network indices such as centrality or constraints. It 
also has the conceptual advantage in that one can introduce 
socio-metric notions of strategy and competition. For instance, when a 
company chooses its transaction partners, its relations are constrained 
by other relations its competitors choose to make. Suppose that x 
chooses y as its partner, and all others choose y as their partner as 
well, the power of y increases (since, in resource dependency theory, 
power is the inverse of dependence). In this situation, the intensity of 
x’s relationship with y is weakened unless x devotes more time and 
energy to y (Burt and Carlton, 1989). By applying a similar logic to 
market networks, one can study input-output from a different angle, as 
each industry is seen as rationally choosing its transaction partners and 
allocating resources proportionally to these partners as a result.
DATA AND METHODS
The South Korean IO tables are compiled by the Bank of Korea every 
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five years. In the present research, to examine changing patterns, we 
used data from 1970, 1980, and 1990, during which time the Korean 
economy has developed most rapidly. The U.S. data used in 
comparison are from the 1990 IO table compiled by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.
Conventionally, an inter-industry network as represented by the IO 
table is measured in terms of structural equivalence. Burt’s pioneering 
work (Burt, 1998; Burt and Carlton, 1989) is a typical example. He 
defines two industries to be structurally equivalent within a network 
to the extent that they have identical patterns of interactions with other 
industries in the network (1988: 359). He uses Euclidean distance to 
measure the degree of structural equivalence, where perfectly 
equivalent network nodes equal zero and increase with the extent that 
the two nodes being evaluated are engaged in different patterns of 
relations with other industrial sectors. Larger values of Euclidean 
distance between nodes mean that they lie farther apart in the social 
typology of the network (Burt, 1988: 359). On the other hand, two 
industries are close together to the extent that they involve “identical 
proportions of purchases” from the same sector as supplier and 
“identical proportions of sales” to each sector as consumer. 
Consequently, for example, if the iron ore mining industry and 
nonferrous ore mining industry are close together, those two industries 
buy from and sell to the same set of industries.
In this paper, instead of relying on the concept of structural 
equivalence, we propose a digraph index of inter-industry 
relationships, which indicates if a pair of industries shares a strong 
relationship of direct transactions. If structural equivalence emphasizes 
the patterns of interactions, a digraph-based index focuses on whether 
or not two industries are directly connected beyond a certain level. 
Consequently, an adjacency matrix was created from the IO table6 to 
calculate the path distances for each pair of industries, i.e., the smallest 
number of steps needed to connect the paired industries. When we 
input this path distance matrix in a multi-dimensional scaling 
algorithm (MDS), we can display a map of inter-industry distances. 
Here, the relative position of an industry is determined by its path 
6 If 10% or more of an industry’s total resources flow to industry j, we recoded cell 
(i, j) to 1, and 0 otherwise. This dichotomization loses information, but we wanted to 
highlight which industry is linked directly with which industries, and to identify which 
industries are the most central in the network. In a structural equivalence approach, 
centrality is almost meaningless. 
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distances to all other industries. If two industries are close together on 
the geometric map, this indicates they are linked to others in relatively 
short path distances. Thus, an industry positioned in the center 
indicates that it can reach the largest number of other industries in 
relatively short path distances.
IS THE KOREAN MARKET STABLE? 
Figure 1 to Figure 3 depict inter-industry structures based on path 
distances among industries. From these figures, two things stand out 
immediately. First, location in the market reflects technological 
association. For example, Coal Mining is linked to Coal Products, and 
Crude Petroleum is linked to Petrochemical and Refinery Products, etc. 
Secondly, the center-periphery structure changes. In all these figures, 
specialized markets, especially industries in the primary sector 
(agriculture, mining, forestry, pulp, etc.) occupy peripheral locations. In 
the 1970s, Communications was in the periphery, but it gradually 
moved to  the  center .  Food-related industr ies  were  at  the 
FIGURE 1. IO STRUCTURE IN 1970
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FIGURE 3. IO STRUCTURE IN 1990
FIGURE 2. IO STRUCTURE IN 1980
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semi-periphery, but moved to the periphery by the 1990s. Retail and 
Wholesale, and Finance and Insurance, the tertiary sector, occupied the 
periphery in the 1960s, but moved to the center by the 1990s, while 
raw materials such as the metal, iron, gas, and petroleum industries 
remained at the margins.
Eyeballing observations has a certain advantage in depicting the 
global structure, but it has limitations in that it does not provide 
statistics that summarize the structure. Thus, we examined the network 
structure using various network analysis techniques.
Comparing the evolution of the market structure over a twenty-year 
period entailed serious methodological problems because the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes have changed with time.7 Some 
changes are negligible at the level of aggregation because only 
distinctions among commodities have changed without affecting the 
grouping of commodities as such. Other changes affected the grouping 
of industries by reclassifying commodities. As a result, it can be 
problematic to compare IO tables in different years. Fortunately, the 
Bank of Korea provided IO tables for 1980 and 1990 with the size (75 
by 75) and commodity classification, which is the same with those of 
the 1970 IO table. We focus on these tables to examine the change over 
the ten-year period during which the market grew the most rapidly: 
the average transaction amount between industries grew from 13,121 
million Won in 1980 to 34,962 million Won in 1990, a 270% increase.
The overall correlation coefficient between the 1980 and 1990 
matrices is .82. This means that 68 percent of the variance of the 1990 
IO table is explained by the 1980 table. The magnitude of change 
appears much greater than the overall changes in the American market 
during the fifteen year period from 1963 to 1977 (Burt, 1988). When 
Burt claimed that the U.S. market was stable, he reported that 92 
percent of variance was explained.8
To investigate the stability of each industry, we calculated the 
correlation between paired vectors of the 1980 and 1990 inputs, and 
paired vectors of the 1980 and 1990 outputs respectively.9 In Figure 4, 
7 The SIC code is a four-digit coding scheme that identifies industries and 
sub-industries.
8 He used somewhat different methods that make an exact comparison difficult. He 
calculated Euclidean distances between pairs of industries from 1963, 1967, 1972, and 
1977 IO tables and used a principal component analysis to explain the variances 
between years.
9 Correlation between a pair of inputs is calculated as (C80ik, C90ik) for k = 1 to 75, 
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FIGURE 4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN PAIRS OF 


























FIGURE 5. THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN PAIRS OF 
1980 AND 1990 OUTPUDT VECTORS
more than 70% of input correlation coefficients and 60% of output 
correlation coefficients are greater than .90, indicating stability. In 
where C80ik is i industry’s transaction with k industry in 1980, and C90ik is i industry’s 
transaction magnitude with k industry in 1990).
138 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
TABLE 1. INDUSTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST STABILITY
Figure 5, output vectors, however, were relatively unstable as 
correlation coefficients of 17 out of 75 industries were smaller than .7. 
This means that the input side changes slower than the output side. 
We argue that this result arises from export-led industrialization, 
where a large chunk of the output goes for export rather than for the 
domestic market, and the main export commodities have changed over 
time (for example, electronics and apparel in the 1980s to 
semiconductors in the 1990s).
Table 1 shows the top ten industries with the highest input and 
output stability. As it turns out, industries belonging to the primary 
sector (coal, iron, agriculture, gas, forest products, tobacco, etc.) and 
related industries (food, fertilizer, pulp) were the most stable in both 
input and output sectors. As shown in Figures 1 to 3, the location of 
these industries remained at the periphery of the market during the 
entire period.
In Table 2, we present the industries that changed most rapidly over 
Output Correlation Input Correlation
Heavy construction 1.000 Coal products 1.000 
Eating and drinking places, and hotels 
and other lodging places
1.000 Petroleum refinery products 1.000 
Bakery and confectionery products, 
and noodles
0.999 Sugar 0.999 
Other food preparations 0.998 
Wearing apparels and 
apparel accessories
0.999 
Chemical fibers 0.998 
Primary iron and steel 
products
0.998 
Chemical fertilizers and agricultural 
chemicals
0.998 Pulp and paper 0.998 
Crude petroleum and natural gas 0.998 Fiber fabrics 0.998 
Leather and fur products 0.998 Meat and dairy products 0.997 
Fiber yarn 0.997 
Polished grains, flour and 
milled cereals
0.997 
Pig iron and crude steel 0.997 Printing and publishing 0.996 
Forestry products 0.996 
Household electric and 
electronic appliances
0.994 
Tobacco products 0.996 Fabricated metal products 0.994 
Livestock breeding and sericulture 0.993 
Plastic material and synthetic 
rubber
0.992 
Agricultural services 0.992 Wood furniture 0.991 
Coal products 0.989 Pig iron and crude steel 0.989 
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TABLE 2. INDUSTRIES WITH THE LOWEST STABILITY
the ten year period in terms of input and output constituents. It is 
interesting to note that service sectors (Business Services, Social 
Services, Education/Research Services, etc.) and newly emerging 
industries (Computers, Plastic Products) changed their partners most 
extensively. Some manufacturing industries such as Communications, 
Drugs, Glass, and Electrical Machinery also changed the patterns of 
their transactions. It seems that newly emerging commodity markets 
with new technological developments have changes in the pattern of 
input-output transactions.
COMPARISON WITH U.S. MARKET STRUCTURE
To answer the question we posed earlier regarding possible 
convergence of the South Korean market to that of the U.S., we 
compare the 1980 and 1990 Korean IO tables with the U.S. 1990 table. 
Because Korea uses a different classification from the U.S., we had to 
Output Correlation Input Correlation
Gas, steam, and hot water supply 0.0 Gas, steam, and hot water supply 0.215 
Water supply 0.269 Communications 0.530 
Polished grains, flour and milled 
cereals 0.471 Drugs, cosmetics, and soap 0.561 
Processed seafood products 0.484 Cement and concrete products 0.580 
Wearing apparels and apparel 
accessories 0.543 Electric services 0.606 
Plastics products 0.579 Inorganic chemical basic products 0.671 
Nonmetallic minerals 0.609 Forestry products 0.699 
Electric services 0.611 Nonmetallic minerals 0.723 
Business services 0.613 Water supply 0.802 
Computer and office equipment 0.614 Heavy construction 0.817 
Educational and research services 0.661 Rubber products 0.832 
Wood furniture 0.685 Building construction and repair 0.848 
Miscellaneous manufacturing products 0.731 Miscellaneous manufacturing products 0.874 
Electrical machinery, equipment, and 
supplies 0.745 Business services 0.884 
Glass, pottery and related products 0.751 Business consumption expenditures 0.888 
Social services 0.782 Educational and research services 0.891 
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FIGURE 6. AVERAGE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INPUT OUTPUT 
VECTOR
reclassify industrial boundaries based on the primary commodities 
produced by each industry. By collapsing the codes, we reclassified the 
IO tables to 61 by 61 IO tables. A diagram in Figure 6 summarizes the 
pattern of average correlation coefficients between inputs and outputs 
as well as between years.
We can see that the Korean market has moved toward the 1990 
American market structure as the average correlation coefficients 
increased from 1980 to 1990. The correlation for input vectors rose 
from .56 to .64 and for output vectors rose from .49 to .54. Since we 
do not have 1980 U.S. data, our finding is somewhat inconclusive, but 
one can safely say that the 1990 Korean market is more similar to the 
1990 U.S. market than the 1980 Korean market. This may indicate a 
narrowing technological gap and rate of market saturation between the 
two countries.
From Figure 6, we can see that the input vector correlation between 
South Korea and the U.S. is higher than the output vector correlation. 
Again, we attribute this result to the fact that Korea’s heavy reliance 
on export-oriented industrialization causes output resources to flow to 
the export sector, rather than to domestic industrial sectors. The 
composition of exports also changed between 1980 and 1990.
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURES OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY
A pairwise comparison of 1980 and 1990 IO vectors does not, 
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TABLE 3. MOVEMENT OF INDUSTRIES BETWEEN THE CENTER AND PERIPHERY, 
MEASURED BY THEIR CENTRALITY RANKING
however, capture the overall changing patterns of transaction networks. 
Therefore, we calculated centrality scores for each industry in the 1980s 
and compared them with the 1990s. According to the centrality 
measure, an industry is central to the extent that most other industries 
send output to that industry, while the sending industries concentrate 
their interactions on that industry. The rationale is similar to the power 
structure in sociometric relations: if more actors choose you as a 
friend, and those actors do not choose any other friends, your power 
increases within the system.
As expected, the Computer, Communications, Finance, and Insurance 
industries became more central in 1990, and the industries in the 
primary sector (Coal, Grain and Flour, Crops, and Beverages) moved 
to the periphery. The movement of industries between center and 
periphery reflects technological associations. For instance, as the market 
grows through deepening industrialization, the relative importance of 
the primary sector declines due to the technical development. 
However, one may speculate that such changes may be facilitated by 
political processes, especially when the developmental state actively 
intervenes in the market. Consequently, we explore the role of the 
Korean government in determining the market structure.
Top 10 Industries moved to the center Top 10 Industries moved to the periphery
Name of industry Rank difference Name of industry
Rank 
difference
Computer and office equipment 42 Polished grains, flour and milled cereals -36
General industrial machinery and 
equipment 24 Coal products -29
Special industry machinery and 
metalworking machinery 20
Wearing apparels and apparel 
accessories -23
Communications equipment 15 Fiber yarn -19
Communications 14 Fiber fabrics -17
Finance and insurance 14 Chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals -16
Processed seafood products 13 Rubber products -16
Motor vehicles 12 Petroleum refinery products -15
Fishery products 12 Beverages -15
Drugs, cosmetics, and soap 12 Crops -13
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ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MARKET STRUCTURATION
When the government wishes to guide and discipline economic 
development, some of its most important policy measures are tariffs, 
tax policy, and targeted policy and bank loans through a tightly 
regulated financial system. In this section, we analyze whether the 
government allocated targeted policy loans or bank loans rationally. If 
loans are made on a rational basis, there should be a strong 
relationship between the amount of the loans and industry importance 
as measured by the centrality scores.
Table 4 shows the government’s policy loans were allocated to 
different industries between the 1960s and 1990s, while the 
inter-correlation between years gets much smaller as the time gap 
increases. This means that the targeted industries changed over time. 
For example, apparel and light manufacturing were targeted in the 
1960s and 1970s, and heavy manufacturing industries in the 1980s and 
1990s.
Table 5 shows the correlation between the industry centrality scores 
and the amount of policy and bank loans distributed to those 
industries from 1963 to 1990. The results suggest that the government 
indeed chose central industries to boost development.10 It is also 
interesting to note that the correlation was strongest (r = .603) in 1980 
when market transactions were expanding most rapidly, and became 
weaker in 1990. This supports the view that the state learned to 
allocate resources rationally in the early industrialization phase, and 
then lost its tight grip on rational economic planning as it gradually 
became vulnerable to rent-seekers (Haggard, Lee, and Maxfield, 
TABLE 4. CORRELATION OF AMOUNT OF POLICY LOANS ALLOCATED TO 
INDUSTRIES ACROSS THE YEARS
Year 1963 1970 1980 1990
1963 1.00
1970 0.968* 1.00
1980 0.631* 0.73* 1.00
1990 0.212* 0.339* 0.821* 1.00
 
10 To examine the unique causal effects of policy loans on the movement of 
industries in the network, one must model a cross-lagged regression: Ct = aCt-1 + 
bPLt-1 + e, where C is centrality and PL is policy loans and e is the error term. 
Unfortunately, our data is too limited to run such a lagged regression.
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TABLE 5. CORRELATION BETWEEN INDUSTRY CENTRALITY AND AMOUNT OF 









To summarize our major findings: 1) the South Korean market seems 
to have evolved toward the structure of an advanced economy, and 
the market structure has changed more rapidly than its American 
counterpart; 2) the selling patterns change more rapidly than the 
buying patterns, due to a heavy reliance on export-led 
industrialization; 3) the government allocated targeted policy loans to 
industries that occupied central locations in the transaction network, 
especially in the 1980s, and such correspondence between network 
centrality and allocation seems to diminish in the 1990s.
We believe the first two findings simply represent market processes. 
That is, as the market expands with technological development, it must 
reflect the technological associations that exist between industries. For 
instance, if an automobile manufacturing industry develops, then its 
buying and selling pattern would reflect technological division of labor 
in the industry, thus increasing resemblance between the Korean 
market structure and that of its American counterpart. The last finding, 
however, needs theoretical elaboration in terms of the developmental 
state theory.
There has been a heated debate between neo-classical economic 
theories and the developmental state paradigm (White and Wade, 1998; 
Islam, 1994). The former rejects the role of an active interventionist 
state in promoting economic growth for three reasons. First, the state 
does not have an informational advantage over the private sector; thus, 
its active involvement only harms the economy by distorting market 
11 An alternative explanation is that the state was not able to predict winning 
industries as a new phase of industrialization is more complicated due to fast 
technological progress and ever-increasing globalization.
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signals. Second, politicians and bureaucrats pursue their own goals 
rather than the national interest and often become predatory. Third, 
state intervention produces rents. The state is often held captive by 
rent-seekers, making the economy inefficient. The role of the state, 
therefore, must be limited to developing policy environments that are 
favorable to a free market. Those who hold neo-classical views argue 
that South Korea developed because the government successfully 
implemented market-friendly strategies to achieve high savings rates, 
relatively low inflation rates, and large investments in human capital, 
etc. (World Bank, 1993; Balassa, 1998).
The developmental state paradigm, on the other hand, argues that 
the economic performance of Korea can be explained by the active 
intervention of the state in the private sector (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 
1995). The state guides, disciplines, and coordinates the private market 
actors through strategic allocation of diverse policy instruments 
(Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). The bureaucrats, who are capable of 
developing and implementing such instruments based on technical 
expertise, are insulated from social pressures of rent-seekers so that 
they can pursue the national interest (Dornbush, 1998).
Our findings suggest that we must take a synthesized view, given 
that the active intervention of the developmental state relied, at least 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, on market-friendly policy 
measures in which the state promoted the most central industries by 
allocating financial resources to the firms in such industries. 
CONCLUSION
Our findings demonstrate that based on its industrial markets, South 
Korea tends to move towards the industrial structure of the U.S., 
despite its very different pattern of state-led industrialization in the 
last several decades. But it would be hasty to say that convergence 
extends to organizational and institutional aspects, as this analysis only 
examines industrial sectors. Furthermore, it does not explore the inner 
dynamics of industrialization, which can be different between South 
Korea and the U.S. Further research is required to prove a tendency 
toward convergence in other domains of the economy. 
The debate on the benefits of convergence versus divergence remains 
to be examined. The trend toward globalization, where nations that 
followed different paths of industrialization gradually converge 
through increasingly integrated markets, has faced increasing resistance 
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in the past few years. National ideology and cultural values also 
function as barriers to homogenization.
The debate is not limited simply to economic trends within the 
world market system. There are also political implications in the 
discussion of convergence and divergence. If the economy of South 
Korea is converging towards that of the U.S., the Korean economy 
may ultimately become a free-market system despite its state-led 
industrialization in its early phase. Because social policies cannot be 
entirely separated from the market, this growing similarity in market 
structure may lead to growing similarity in other areas as well. For 
example, we may witness similar changes in the area of welfare 
programs, budget allocation, and industrial policies that advanced 
economies currently experience in the age of economic and political 
globalization. This will certainly affect the future of the Korean 
economy and its political system.
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